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The Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) element integrates all the subsystems needed for ascent 
flight, entry, and recovery of the combined Booster and Motor system.  These include the 
structures, avionics, thrust vector control, pyrotechnic, range safety, deceleration, thermal 
protection, and retrieval systems.  This represents the only human-rated, recoverable and 
refurbishable solid rocket ever developed and flown.   
Challenges included subsystem integration, thermal environments and severe loads 
(including water impact), sometimes resulting in hardware attrition.  Several of the 
subsystems evolved during the program through design changes.  These included the 
thermal protection system, range safety system, parachute/recovery system, and others.  
Obsolescence issues occasionally required component recertification.  Because the system 
was recovered, the SRB was ideal for data and imagery acquisition, which proved essential 
for understanding loads and system response.   
The three main parachutes that lower the SRBs to the ocean are the largest parachutes 
ever designed, and the SRBs are the largest structures ever to be lowered by parachutes.  
SRB recovery from the ocean was a unique process and represented a significant operational 
challenge; requiring personnel, facilities, transportation, and ground support equipment.  
The SRB element achieved reliability via extensive system testing and checkout, 
redundancy management, and a thorough postflight assessment process.  Assembly and 
integration of the booster subsystems was a unique process and acceptance testing of reused 
hardware components was required for each build.  Extensive testing was done to assure 
hardware functionality at each level of stage integration.  Because the booster element is 
recoverable, subsystems were available for inspection and testing postflight, unique to the 
Shuttle launch vehicle.  Problems were noted and corrective actions were implemented as 
needed.  The postflight assessment process was quite detailed and a significant portion of 
flight operations.   
The SRBs provided fully redundant critical systems including thrust vector control, 
mission critical pyrotechnics, avionics, and parachute recovery system.  The design intent 
was to lift off with full redundancy.  On occasion, the redundancy management scheme was 
needed during flight operations.  This paper describes some of the design challenges, how the 
design evolved with time, and key areas where hardware reusability contributed to 
improved system level understanding. 
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Nomenclature
ASA = Altitude Switch Assembly 
CRD = Command Receiver/Decoder 
CST™ = Convergent Spray Technology™ 
DAS = Data Acquisition System 
DFI = Developmental Flight Instrumentation 
EDAS = Enhanced Data Acquisition System 
EPA = Environmental Protection Agency 
ET = External Tank 
ETA = External Tank Attach 
FOS = Factor of Safety 
IEA = Integrated Electronics Assembly 
IRD = Integrated Receiver/Decoder 
KSC = Kennedy Space Center 
LMP = Large Main Parachute 
MCC-1 = Marshall Convergent Coating, 1st 
Generation 
MLP = Mobile Launch Platform 
MMT = Mission Management Team 
MSA-1, -2 = Marshall Sprayable Ablator, 1st or 
2nd Generation 
MSFC = Marshall Space Flight Center 
NASA = National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration 
psi = Pressure. Pound per Square Inch 
RSD = Range Safety Distributor 
RSS = Range Safety System 
SMP = Small Main Parachute 
SRB = Solid Rocket Booster 
STS = Space Transportation System 
TPS = Thermal Protection System 
 
I. SRB-101 
he SRBs are the largest solid propellant rocket motors ever flown, and the first designed for reuse.  The two 
SRBs provide the main thrust to lift the Space Shuttle off the launch pad to an altitude of ~150,000 feet (28 
miles) and burn for 123 seconds during ascent.  Each SRB is 149.16 feet long, 12.17 feet in diameter and weighs 
~1,300,000 pounds at launch.  During flight, each SRB burns ~1,100,000 pounds of propellant, with a final weight 
of ~192,000 pounds.  The flight sequence for the SRBs can be seen in Figure 1, from lift-off through retrieval. 
 
The primary elements/systems of the SRBs include the solid rocket motor (motor case, propellant, igniter and 
nozzle), forward and aft structures, separation systems, operational flight instrumentation, recovery avionics, 
pyrotechnics, deceleration system, thrust vector control system and range safety destruct system.  Each booster is 
attached to the External Tank (ET) at the SRBs aft frame by two lateral sway braces and a diagonal attachment 
T 
 
Figure 1. SRB Flight Sequence 
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(struts).  The forward end of each SRB is attached to the ET on a ball fitting on the SRBs forward skirt.  On the 
launch pad, each booster is secured to the Mobile Launcher Platform (MLP) at the aft skirt by four bolts and 
frangible nuts which are severed by small explosives at lift-off.  In fact, the entire Space Shuttle system is attached 
to the MLP with these eight bolts!  The two SRBs carry the entire weight of the ET and Orbiter, and transmit the 
weight load (4,500,000 pounds) through their structure to the MLP.  
Each booster has a sea level thrust of ~2,800,000 pounds at launch (peaking to 3,300,000 pounds).  The two 
SRBs provide ~83% of the lift-off thrust.  At 123 seconds/150,000 feet (technically when the propellant is 
consumed), a series of pyrotechnic events occur to disconnect the SRBs from the ET at the struts and forward attach 
point, followed by eight Booster Separation Motors per SRB igniting for a 0.8 second burn, providing 20,000 
pounds of thrust each, and pushing the SRBs safely away from the ET and Orbiter. 
Seventy- five seconds after SRB separation, the SRBs reach apogee at an altitude of ~220,000 feet (41 miles).  
During decent through the Earth’s atmosphere, the SRBs aerodynamically bleed energy, slowing down sufficiently 
until the deceleration system initiates.  The SRB deceleration sequence provides attitude and terminal velocity 
control of the SRB for water impact.  This system is located in the forward assembly of each SRB and is comprised 
of the drogue pilot assembly, main parachute cluster assembly and altitude switch assembly.  SRB water impact 
occurs in the ocean ~141 miles downrange.  The SRBs and parachutes are retrieved and towed back to Kennedy 
Space Center (KSC) for reuse via recovery ships.  The retrieval process begins once splash down occurs (T+6.5 
minutes) in the ocean and the ships approach each SRB for recovery operations.  At KSC, the SRBs are inspected, 
disassembled, refurbished, re-assembled, stacked and integrated with an ET and Orbiter, and the process begins 
anew (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. SRB Circle of Life. 
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II. SRB History, Evolution and Key Lessons Learned for Five Selected Subsystems 
Over the next few sections, this paper will provide insight into several of the key systems of the SRBs and how 
they have developed over the years.  This evolution has been a result of the years of flight data and evaluation of the 
recovered hardware, something that would not have been possible if the SRBs were not recovered and reused. 
III. Evolution of Sprayable Acreage Thermal Protection System (TPS) 
Marshall Sprayable Ablative (MSA)-1 was used as a TPS on the frustum and forward skirts from STS-1.  It was 
developed at NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC).  The nose cap was also included starting with STS-4, 
replacing sheet cork that was manually bonded to the structure.  MSA-1 was a glass and resin based material that 
was sprayed onto flight hardware and eliminated the prior labor intensive cork bonding process.  MSA-1 had a 
maximum application thickness of 0.25 inches, which precluded application on several components, including the 
aft skirt.  This limitation was based on observed stress cracking during the cure cycle for greater thicknesses.  MSA-
1 was a noted debris concern during STS-27 (December 1988), when material from the nose cap was associated with 
Orbiter tile damage. 
MSA-2 was developed to replace MSA-1.  It was intended to extend the application to more hardware 
components and improve performance.  On STS-29 (May 1989), MSA-2 was first flown on the forward assembly.  
On STS-28 (August 1989), it was first flown on the aft skirt.  The formulation changes from MSA-1 to MSA-2 
reduced the TPS susceptibility to stress cracking during curing, thus the maximum application thickness was 
increased to 0.5 inches.  Other improvements on its predecessor included the elimination of a carcinogenic curing 
agent, increased strength, improved adhesion, and shortened processing time, but MSA-2 was still considered 
hazardous waste, like MSA-1, due to use of solvents during the application process. 
Marshall Convergent Coating (MCC-1) was developed to 
address Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) mandates, 
eliminating solvents and the classification as hazardous 
waste.  Processing and the overall material capability for 
MCC-1 were also significant improvements over MSA-2 due 
to the use of Convergent Spray Technology™ (CST™).  This 
application method was developed in-house to apply the 
coating by mixing multiple streams of materials at the 
application surface (Figure 3).  CST™ is what eliminated the 
need for solvents.  MCC-1 was first flown on the left-hand 
SRB during STS-79 (September 1996), and fully 
implemented for STS-80 (November 1996).  In addition to 
Space Shuttle SRB applications, MCC-1 was used for the Air 
Force Titan program, eliminating its non-environmentally-
compliant TPS. 
The incorporation of MCC-1 resulted in significant process improvements, such as reduced setup time, mixing 
on demand and consistent surface finish.  MCC-1 reduced the constituents required, from eleven to five, reducing 
material storage and handling requirements (MCC-1 constituents later increased to six, adding an accelerator to the 
epoxy).  In addition, MCC-1 had superior strength over its predecessors, with flat-wise tensile capabilities in excess 
of 200 psi, vs. 50 psi for MSA-1 and 75 psi for MSA-2.  MCC-1 also had improved thermal properties, indicated by 
improved recession characteristics (when exposed to the combination of heating and aerodynamic shear).  MCC-1 
was qualified to be applied over more substrates than previous sprayable ablators, thus further reducing hardware 
processing time.  The only trade-off from MSA-2 was that MCC-1, despite allowing thinner applications, had a 
higher density, and thus resulted in a slight increase in TPS weight for the vehicle.  However, the latest incarnation 
of the sprayable acreage TPS (with its associated top-coat of Hypalon) has been demonstrated as being very robust 
in the flight environment.  It is tolerant of impacts from in-flight debris sources, and it has minimal propensity to 
self-liberate debris. 
IV. SRB Camera and Data Acquisition System Development 
The Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Boosters were the first of their kind to be recovered and reused.  In order to 
support that design requirement, flight environments, performance and imagery data were acquired heavily during 
the onset of the program, and the flight hardware was refined and improved throughout the program.  Data systems 
were located on chase planes, boats and on-board the flight hardware.  They all played a key role for assessing the 
vehicle performance as well as providing a better understanding of the flight environments. 
 
Figure 3. Convergent Spray Technology™ mixes 
solids and liquids during application process. 
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For the first six Space Shuttle flights, a full set of Developmental Flight Instrumentation (DFI) was acquired, 
measuring in-flight parameters such as temperatures, pressures, accelerations, strains and heating rates.  Thereafter, 
a limited set of data was acquired on several flights, until Return to Flight from the Challenger Accident, where we 
had three more flights of DFI.  Starting STS-72 (January 1996), an on-board Data Acquisition System (DAS) was 
installed which recorded accelerometer data within the forward skirt to assess splashdown loads at water impact.  An 
“enhanced” system (EDAS) was also used periodically from STS-91 (June 1998) to gather specific data for an area 
of interest  (i.e. thermocouples to assess TPS removal, strain gages, accelerometers and/or force gages to validate 
analytical models, and most recently pressure and strain gages to assess SRB thrust oscillations).  With this data, the 
booster design could be continually examined, allowing analysis models to be further developed and refined to 
predict the hardware performance.   
In addition to data acquisition systems, in-flight 
imagery was acquired, starting with video from tracking 
ships as well as Air Force Starcast and Navy Castglance 
aircraft.  STS-41G (October 1984) incorporated a 16mm 
camera to capture parachute deployment, and it was used 
periodically on subsequent flights.  Camcorders were 
implemented into the DAS system starting on STS-77 
(May 1996).  A second flight camera was installed on 
STS-95 (October 1998), and utilized for five flights to 
observe External Tank (ET) foam performance on the 
Intertank (the region between the liquid oxygen and 
liquid hydrogen tanks), and was permanently 
implemented on STS-114 (July 2005).  On STS-121 
(July 2006), two more in-flight video cameras were 
added to the SRBs to evaluate ascent debris concerns, 
with one camera on the forward skirt of the SRBs 
looking aft, and another on the ET Attach Ring looking forward (Figure 4).  All of these cameras, in addition to the 
ground-based imagery, ET Feedline Camera and Orbiter imagery, were tools that provided the Mission Management 
Team (MMT) valuable data to assist in evaluating the on-orbit condition of the Orbiter.  In addition, the cameras 
provided details of in-flight anomalies, such as parachute failures (Figure 5) and material liberation that could strike 
the Orbiter (Figure 6). 
From chase planes and boats, to on-board digital systems, data acquisition has been a key tool for supporting 
assessment of vehicle performance and in-flight debris imagery.  Such data supports flight assessments, expands 
upon the understanding of flight environments (and their variability from flight-to-flight) and provides records of 
historical performance, which has led to improved hardware designs and processing.  The systems used on the flight 
vehicle were classified as low criticality hardware, but they provided invaluable data throughout the program. 
V. Command Receiver/Decoder (CRD) Design and Implementation 
The Space Shuttle Vehicle has a flight termination system called the Range Safety System (RSS).  This system is 
available to protect the general population or property in case either a major malfunction or errant flight path occur 
 
Figure 5. STS-122 Parachute Failure Observed With 
Parachute Forward Skirt Dome Camera. 
 
Figure 4. STS-114 (July 26, 2005) Views from SRB 
Forward and Aft Pointing Cameras. 
 
Figure 6. STS-116 In-Flight Anomaly of TPS 
Striking the Orbiter during SRB Separation. 
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during the boost stage of flight.  The RSS terminates flight by splitting the motor cases of the SRBs, which 
eliminates thrust.  If off-nominal conditions occur, a decision is made whether to allow continued vehicle flight (if 
hazards to life and/or property are decreasing) or to immediately initiate flight termination action.  Each SRB was 
equipped with two command antennas in conjunction with associated electronics to interpret the Eastern Test Range 
range-safety command signals and, if needed, initiate the linear shaped charges affixed to the SRB motor case.  The 
CRD is one of the associated electronics boxes. 
The CRD implementation was originally developed for an RSS for the ET.  However, an RSS for the ET was 
subsequently eliminated.  Due to concerns of supportability and obsolescence, SRB evaluated the CRD design and 
determined it could be used to replace its aging RSS electronics boxes (Integrated Receiver/Decoder (IRD) and 
Range Safety Distributor (RSD)) (Figure 7). 
The design configuration is such that there are redundant CRD A and B systems processing command signals 
independently.  Unfortunately, it was not until integrated system level testing that a design deficiency was 
discovered.  The CRD A and B electrical return paths for a particular command signal (Orbiter power) were not 
isolated from each other or the SRB structure.  The consequence was a modification of the electrical circuit to 
separate the command signal return from the other paths.  Subsequently, the redesigned CRD passed all qualification 
testing and successfully began flying on STS-118 (August 2007). 
The design flaw could have been identified earlier in the development process.  The root cause was identified as 
inconsistent terminology from the system to the component level. In this case, the Orbiter power was treated as a 
command signal during requirements development and design, and therefore the power isolation system requirement 
was not identified.  System level testing was a key factor to identifying this design deficiency.  For the CRD 
development, this occurred late into the cycle, which required additional efforts to bring the system into compliance 
with the design requirements.  In addition, a strong involvement of systems engineering, particularly during the early 
development phase, would have greatly benefited the design, especially when dealing with multiple subsystems.   
VI. External Tank Attach Ring Evolution 
The External Tank Attach (ETA) Ring is the structure on the SRB where aft 
attach points to the ET exist, as well as the location for the aft Integrated 
Electronics Assembly (IEA) is mounted (Figure 8).  The original design of the 
ring was such that it spanned 270° around the circumference of the SRB, 
providing a load path for the aft attachment to the SRB structure.  
Following the Challenger accident, detailed structural analyses were 
performed on critical structural elements of the SRB, focused on areas where 
anomalies were noted during postflight inspection of the recovered and 
refurbished hardware.  As a result, it was noted that the region where fasteners 
attach the ETA Ring to the SRB motor case experienced high levels of distress 
during thrust buildup.  As a consequence of these assessments, the ETA Ring 
was redesigned to completely encircle the motor case (360°), which provided 
higher strength margins throughout the SRB flight and water impact (Figure 9).  
In 2003, MSFC testing to support a fracture mechanics rebaseline analysis 
identified suspect material strength conditions for ETA Ring 4130 steel due to 
inconsistent heat treatment.  This reduced the minimum Factor of Safety (FOS) 
from the requirement of 1.4 down to 1.25 for the design load case and worst 
case material properties.  The actual FOS for STS-107 based upon flight specific loads was 1.3 (still greater than 1.0, 
but a violation of the requirement).  The hardware for the next two flights, STS-114 and STS-121, underwent 
extensive (serial-number specific) material testing and analysis to certify compliance with the 1.4 FOS requirement.  
For STS-115 (and subsequent flights), ETA Rings with a new grade of steel, 4340, were manufactured. This 
 
Figure 7. Previous IRD/RSD Configuration vs. New CRD Configuration. 
 
Figure 8. ETA Ring Location. 
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Figure 9. 270° vs. 360° ETA Ring. 
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material, being less susceptible to heat treat anomalies, eliminated the need for flight-by-flight testing and evaluation 
because they met the drawing material properties and FOS requirement.  
The ETA Ring issue 
illustrates how appropriate 
design requirements can 
account for out-of-specification 
material properties, or any 
other variables.  In this case, 
the use of a FOS was 
imperative for safe and reliable 
mission completion.  Also, the 
original issue with the 270° 
ETA ring demonstrated 
through postflight inspection 
design weaknesses can be 
identified, and resolved - 
something that would not have 
been so easily identified for 
non-reusable hardware.  
VII. Evolution of SRB Recovery Systems (Parachutes) 
The design requirement for reusability of the SRBs resulted in the development of a hardy recovery system.  An 
Altitude Switch Assembly (ASA) located within the forward assembly initiates the parachute deployment process at 
the appropriate altitude as determined by pressure measurement (Figure 10, Figure 11).  Then, through a series of 
hardware releases, parachute deployments and parachute disreefings, the SRBs are slowed down for a safe water 
landing, where retrieval ships recover the parachutes and flight structures, and bring them back to Kennedy Space 
Center for postflight inspection and refurbishment.   
The major evolution of the parachute system occurred early on the Space Shuttle Program after initial system 
failures.  Improvements to the parachute recovery systems include modification of line release mechanisms, increase 
of the parachute canopy diameter, changes to the reefing ratios, implementation of ripstops and modifications to the 
canopy vent.  Many of the changes were strongly influenced by the presence of in-flight imagery/video, which 
 
Figure 10. SRB Recovery Sequence Part 1:  Descent through Drogue Parachute Disreef 
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allowed the SRB team to understand the flight environments and the dynamics of the descending SRBs, as well as 
insight into the various failure mechanisms that could occur. 
The initial SRB main parachutes were called “Small Main Parachutes” (SMP).  The SMP had a canopy diameter 
of 115 feet, and resulted in water impact velocities of approximately 90 feet per second.  Starting with STS-41D 
(August 1984), larger parachutes, called the “Large Main Parachutes” (LMP), with a diameter of 136 feet and 
resultant water impact velocities of approximately 76 feet per second, were flown, and fully incorporated starting 
STS-51D (April 1985).  The larger canopy parachutes provided a twofold benefit.  First, they reduced the water 
impact velocity and consequently the impact loads and potential for structural damage.  Second, they increased the 
SRB survivability from a single parachute failure, where the water impact velocity under two LMP would be 
comparable to that of three SMP, thus reducing the possibility of structural damage from a hard water impact. 
The first failure of the recovery system occurred on STS-3, where a main parachute failed due to entanglement 
with floats installed for assisting in retrieval of the parachutes.  Next, on STS-4 (June 1982), the floats were 
removed.  However, an unrelated failure occurred where the parachute lines released from the deck fittings prior to 
deployment.  The parachute lines utilized g-load activated release mechanisms to sever the lines upon water impact, 
minimizing the possibility of underwater diver entanglement in the vicinity of the SRB during recovery.  The root 
cause was deemed that during frustum separation (when the drogue parachute was released), the g-load switch 
initiated the deck fitting pyrotechnics; thus pre-maturely releasing one of the two deck fittings on each main 
parachute.  In such a configuration, the parachutes provided no drag during the remaining SRB descent resulting in 
an SRB water impact velocity of six times the predicted value, and the SRBs sank into the ocean.  As a result of this 
failure, the switch was deactivated (from STS-5, November 1982, to STS-61C, January 1986), until a timer 
mechanism was incorporated that released the deck fittings about the time of water impact.  During this time period, 
the retrieval divers manually cut the lines.  After the timers were implemented to release the deck fittings, the SRBs 
started exhibiting structural damage that was associated with the slap-down of the SRB into the ocean (the SRBs 
 
Figure 11. SRB Recovery Sequence Part 2:  Main Parachute Deployment through Water Impact 
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Figure 12. Rip Stop. 
   
Figure 13. Sequential Stacking Design vs. Hengel Weave. 
impact the water vertically, but then fall over and “slap” the surface horizontally 
before settling back to a bobbing spar/buoy position).  Consequently, on STS-86 
(September 1997), sea-water activated switches were incorporated to release the 
lines once the SRB settled more gently into the water as the parachutes settled 
into the ocean, and reduced the chance for structural damage. 
Another parachute system improvement first flown on STS-33R (November 
1989) was the incorporation of ripstops within the canopy (Figure 12).  These 
consisted of six horizontal bands of high-strength nylon added to the LMP to 
mitigate a tear from propagating completely through the parachute canopy, 
thereby allowing the parachute to remain inflated during descent.  The spacing of 
the ripstops was defined by analytical models of the canopy loading.  Since 
incorporation, ripstops have been determined to have prevented total failure of a 
parachute on seven occasions.   
A third (iterative) improvement to the SRB parachutes occurred in the main 
parachute vent, which is the top of the canopy.  Starting on STS-51F (July 1985), 
a vent cap (i.e. additional horizontal canopy members) was added, decreasing the 
vent diameter from 11.6 to 5.6 feet.  This design modification allowed the 
canopy to inflate more reliably to the first reefed condition.  However, there were intermittent cases of major 
damage that was eventually attributed to the lagging inflation of the parachute that led to vent line entanglement.  
The vent cap consisted of 80 vent lines stacked in a constant clockwise sequence that created large openings and a 
large mass at the center.   The openings allowed air to escape, slowing inflation, and the large mass of lines to 
tangle, causing parachute damage.  The 
next improvement of the LMP vent 
occurred on STS-95 (October 1998), 
where the vent lines were woven 
together in an alternating stacking 
method called the Hengel Weave 
(Figure 13), which organized (eight 
groups of ten vent lines) and 
constrained the vent lines.  This 
eliminated two large slots in the vent 
and prevented the concentration of a 
vent line mass, further helping the 
parachute inflate more reliably to its first reefed condition.   
Once again, the usage of in-flight imagery had proven invaluable in the assessment of the various parachute 
system failures during the life of the program, helping to improve the understanding of parachute dynamics, their 
failure mechanisms and the implementation of design improvements. 
VIII. Conclusion 
Through the 30 years of flight and 135 shuttle missions, 270 SRBs have seen flight. Each flight, using data 
systems from air, sea, ground and flight hardware, the acquisition of flight environments, hardware performance and 
flight imagery data has proven to be invaluable to assessing and improving the hardware.  The proper use of design 
safety factors ensures hardware will perform as expected even when the environments or source materials are 
outside the experience base.   
Although the reusability of the SRB has been highly successful, it never fulfilled the program’s original goal of 
“wash, dry and fly”.  The primary structures and Line Replaceable Units were qualified to 40 and 20 missions 
respectively.  The qualification tests were done without disassembly between mission exposures.  That said, due to 
the harsh environments the Booster hardware was exposed to each flight, including highly variable water impact 
loads (driven by horizontal velocity, sea state, and slap-down loads) the necessity of performing a more 
comprehensive refurbishment was required for certification of each additional flight.   Refurbishment included 
significant disassembly, inspection, reassembly and bench tests that defined the booster circle of life each mission 
flow.  It should be noted that the information gleaned from the postflight inspection/tests resulted in the 
development of the reuse standard, referred to as the SRB Refurbishment Specification (10SPC-0131).  This detailed 
document specified the allowable defect criteria for each reusable part as well as levying the inspection and test 
criteria required to place that part back into serviceable stock. 
September 26-29, 2011
SRB - 2
 SRB Full Flight Video
 Overview of Booster Evolution
 Detailed Discussion on 
Lessons Learned 
– Evolution of Sprayable Acreage TPS
– SRB Camera and Data Acquisition Systems
– Implementation of Command Receiver 
Decoder
– External Tank Attach Ring Material Issue
– Parachutes and Recovery Systems
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STS-117
 Largest solid propellant rocket motors ever flown 
– First designed for reuse
• Height = 149.2 ft;  Diameter = 12.2 ft in 
• Launch Weight = ~1.3 million lbs
 Main thrust to lift Space Shuttle off launch pad and 
to altitude of 150,000 ft (28 miles)
• Sea level lift-off thrust ~2,800,000 lbs per SRB
– Peaking to 3,300,000 lbs
– ~83% of lift-off thrust
– SRBs attached to ET at SRBs aft frame by struts
• Forward end attached to ET on ball fitting
– On launch pad, SRBs secured to MLP by 8 bolts 
and frangible nuts 
• Severed by explosives at lift-off
• SRBs carry entire weight of ET and Orbiter
– 4,500,000 lbs
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 SRBs burn for 123 seconds during ascent
– ~1,100,000 lbs propellant per SRB consumed
• Final SRB weight = ~192,000 lbs
– At 123 seconds/150,000 ft
• pyrotechnic events disconnect SRBs from ET, 
• BSM ignition push safely away from ET/Orbiter
– 75 seconds after SRB sep, SRBs reach apogee
• Altitude ~220,000 feet (41 miles)
• Deceleration sequence initiation provides attitude 
and terminal velocity control for water impact
– SRBs & parachutes retrieved ~140 miles
downrange from KSC
• Towed back to KSC for reuse via recovery ships
• SRBs inspected, disassembled, refurbished, re-assembled, 
stacked and integrated with ET and Orbiter
– Process begins anew
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SRB - 6
Forward 
Assembly
Frustum – Parachute 
Mate
TVC Assembly
Parachute Packing
Forward Shirt 
Assembly
High Pressure 
Stripping of TPS
TPS Application
SRB in Spar 
Buoy Mode
SRB in Straddle-Lift Over Slip 
at Hangar AF
Divers 
Inserting DOP
Retrieval
Aft Skirt 
Assembly
Stacking
Launch
Robotic 
Stripping of TPS
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• Recovery Loads Data Acquisition 
System (DAS) (STS-72, 1-11-96)
• DAS Parachute Camera (STS-77, 5-19-96)
• Command Receiver/Decoder (CRD) (STS-118, 8-8-07)
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•Note: RH SRB Shown
• MSA-1 for Nose Cap Acerage (STS-4, 6-27-82)
• Large Main Parachutes (STS-41D, 8-30-84)
• Main Parachute Ripstop (STS-33, 11-22-89)
• 16 mm Parachute Camera 
(STS-51A, 11-8-84)
• MSA-2 Acreage Thermal 
Protection System (TPS)
(STS-29, 3-13-89)
• MCC-1 Acreage TPS (STS-79, 9-16-96)
•Color Key: Blue denotes 
•detail discussion
• Modified Main 
Parachute Float  
Assembly 
(STS-77, 5-19-96)
• Sea Water Actuated Release (SWAR) Links 
(STS-86, 9-25-97)
• External Tank (ET) 
Observation Camera  
(STS-114, 7-26-05)
• Enhanced DAS (EDAS) 
(STS-106, 9-8-00)
•ET attach ring design changed 
from 270° to 360° (STS-26, 9-29-
88)
 Utilized MSA-1 on frustum and forward skirts beginning STS-1
– Incorporated on nose cap STS-4
 MSA-2 developed for aft skirt application and to replace MSA-1
– STS-29 first flight on forward assembly and STS-28 for aft skirt
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MSA-1 
Summary
Benefit • Spray application
• Eliminated labor intensive cork bonding
Limitation • Maximum thickness of 0.25 in
• Subjected to stress cracking during cure
Comment • Nose cap MSA-1 associated with Orbiter tile damage (STS-27)
MSA-2 
Summary
Benefit • Increased strength and flexibility
• Supports coating thickness up to 0.5 in
• Incorporated ground cork and new epoxy resin system
• Eliminated suspect carcinogens (catalyst curing agent)
Limitation • Formulated in solvent carrier to facilitate spraying
• Hazardous waste (same as MSA-1)
 MCC-1 developed and qualified between 1992 and 1995
– Address EPA mandate to severely limit hazard pollutant emissions
– Utilized Convergent Spray TechnologyTM developed by USBI
 Convergent Spray TechnologyTM
– Apply coatings by converging multiple streams
of different materials
– Deliver dry filler materials and fluid binder
materials separately to spray gun
– Proprietary nozzle convergently mixes
constituents external to gun tip as sprayed 
SRB - 10
MCC-1 
Summary
Benefit • Not Hazardous - CSTTM eliminated need for solvents
• Significant process improvement
•Reduce setup time, mix on demand, consistent surface finish
• Superior strength capability
• Strength 4x and 3x greater than MSA-1 and MSA-2, respectively
Limitation • None
 MCC-1 first flown on STS-79 LH aft skirt 
– Fully implemented as MSA-2 replacement on STS-80 (1996)
– Experienced extremely successful flight history since
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Lessons Learned
Trade-off between being environmentally friendly and 
performance not always required
 Photographic coverage of SRB descent 
and parachute deployment important at 
beginning of Shuttle Program
– Provided by ship and aircraft 
• Redstone/Vandenberg ships and Starcast/Castglance aircraft
– Discontinued after STS-35 (12-2-90)
 STS-51A (11-8-84) first installed
16 mm camera into forward skirt dome 
to capture parachute deployment
– Implemented permanently STS-36 (2-28-90)
– Upgraded to Data Acquisition System (DAS)
with video camera STS-72 (1-11-96)
• Included recording accelerometers data
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STS-1
4-12-81
STS-7
STS-36
2-28-90
STS-131
 Postflight photographs of off-nominal 
items taken since STS-26 (9-29-88)
– Used for comparisons to build-up 
and previous missions photographs
– Minimal photographic requirements established and 
controlled by engineering (10REQ-0033)
 Additional photography during recovery 
from on-board observer initiated 
after STS-26 (9-29-88)
– Enhancements throughout follow-on 
missions including
• Both stills and video and improved equipment
• Detailed guidelines and recommendations
• Underwater observations during dives
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Recovery
Aft Skirt Bluing
12-85-01
STS-120
 Second camera installed in forward 
skirt on STS-95 (10-29-98) to observe 
ET foam popcorning from intertank
– Utilized for five flights
– Permanently implemented on STS-114 
(7-26-05)
 STS-121 implemented two additional 
standard SRB cameras to evaluate 
ascent debris conditions
– Forward skirt aft looking and ETA ring forward looking 
cameras
– Refinements incorporated to improve camera settings 
and modify field of view
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STS-95
10-29-98
STS-125
STS-114
7-26-05
STS-117
 Learned capability of hardware
 Expanded understanding of 
environments and associated 
variability from flight to flight
 Allows flight specific evaluations 
to assess time of occurrence 
and debris hazards 
 Ultimately supports taking 
advantage of fact SRB recovered 
to improve designs and 
processing 
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BTA from Aft BSM 
Hits Orbiter
STS-116
Parachute Failure 
STS-122
Hardwater impact
STS-122 Hypalon Off Gassing
STS-114
Riser Line Cut
STS-130
Lessons Learned
• Picture = thousand words 
• Some Criticality 3 systems are 
really important
 CRD initially developed for ET Range Safety System 
(RSS)
 ET subsequently eliminated RSS
 CRD design evaluated and implemented in SRB due to 
Integrated Receiver/Decoder (IRD) and Range Safety 
Distributor (RSD) supportability/obsolescence concerns
 CRD combined IRD/RSD functions into single design
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CRD B
Previous IRD/RSD Configuration New CRD Configuration
CRD A
IRD RSD
 CRD integrated system 
testing discovered 
design deficiency
– Orbiter A and B bus returns not 
isolated from each other or 
SRB structure
 Root cause identified 
– Orbiter power treated as 
command signal  during 
requirements development and 
design
• Likely discovered earlier if source 
(power)  considered rather 
than function (RSTS CMD)
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RSTS = Resistance Test     CMD = Command 
ORB = Orbiter RTN = Return
RSTS CMD
RSTS CMD RTN
ORB BUS A
ORB BUS B
ORB BUS B RTN
RSTS CMD
RSS
Battery
RSTS
CMD
Recovery
Battery
RSTS CMD
RSTS CMD RTN
CRD A
CRD B
Battery In
Battery 
RTN
Battery In
Battery
RTN
CRD A
Common
Structure
CRD B
Common
Structure
RSTS
CMD
Integrated
Electronics
Assembly
(IEA)
ORB BUS A RTN
RSTS 
Circuit
RSTS 
Circuit
CRD Design Deficiency
SRB Design Realm
Outcome
 Modified circuit to separate RSTS command return from CRD 
common return and SRB structure
 Subsequently passed all qualification testing and successfully 
flown CRD design since STS-118/BI130 (14 total flights)
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Lessons Learned
• Maintain consistent signal terminology from system to component
• Perform system level testing early in development process
• Include systems engineering in all development phases
 Initial 4130 steel ETA ring spanned 270°
 Redesigned ETA ring to 360° for STS-26
– Modified existing hardware
– Eliminated negative margins of safety during thrust build-up
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360 ETA Ring Components
Splice Plate
Cable Bracket
Filler Plate
Ring Web
Ring Cap
Intercostal Bracket
ETA Ring Location
ETA Rings
360° ETA Ring
270 ETA Ring
STA. 1511.0
ETA Ring 
Buildup
 MSFC found suspect strength properties 
during early 2003 testing for 
ETA ring fracture properties 
– Historically used generic properties
for all alloy steels
 Design load case analysis using worst case 
material properties resulted in minimum Factor Of 
Safety (FOS) of 1.25 
– Violated FOS requirement of 1.4
– Analysis completed day before STS-107 launch
– STS-107 flight specific loads analysis supported FOS of 1.3
 SRB presented issue and waiver rationale at 
STS-107 ET Tanking Meeting 1-16-03
– Tanking meeting not Mission Management Team (MMT) meeting
– Waiver CR S091496 approved
– STS-107 ETA rings performed successfully as expected
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ETA Ring
Tensile Strength (ksi)
Yield Ultimate
Test * 130-189 152-202
Requirement 163 180
* Performed on ETA Ring S/N 13
Outcome
 Extensive testing and evaluation performed
to certify 1.4 FOS requirement for STS-114 
and STS-126
 Procured 4340 steel ETA rings for STS-115
– New components manufactured under 
fracture critical and critical process
control requirements 
• Web plates, splice plates, filler plates,
ring caps, intercostal brackets, 
and cable brackets
• Only Inconel 718 H-fittings common
SRB - 21
Ring Segment
H-fitting
ETA Ring 
Hardness Testing
Lessons Learned
• Significant safety concerns require 
discussion at appropriate level to ensure full 
awareness of associated risks
• Reason for safety margins
 First 13 flights used Small Main 
Parachutes (SMP) – 115 ft diameter
– Observed damage during deployment due to 
reentry and parachute dynamics
– Sometimes led to parachute failures
– Resulted in significant splashdown damage and 
threatened booster retrieval
 Large Main Parachutes (LMP) flew 
on STS-14RH – 136 ft diameter
– Sized for impact velocity of 2 LMP to be same as 3 
SMP (~90 ft/sec)
– Greatly decreased post flight damage on booster
– Improved hardware survivability with one 
parachute failure
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Story (cont.)
 Implementation of Rip-stops began 17 
flights after LMP
– Reinforced parachute in strategic locations
– Reduced tear propagation and prevented total Gore 
failure
 Incorporated Hengel Weave STS-95 at 
vent cap
– Design changed to organize and constrain vent lines
• Reduced entanglement during deployment that led to 
parachute failure
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Stack Design
Hengel Weave
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Parachute evolution focused on retrieving hardware and improving 
condition for reuse
Lessons Learned
• Picture = thousand words
• Some Criticality 3 systems are 
really important
